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Abstract

The West German peace movement of tile eighties has been _subject to many of
the ".ebbs and flows 111 characteristic of protest movements of the late sixties
and early seventies, with one important exception.

In contrast to the more

doctrinaire Marxist/socialist orientations evinced by those earlier movements,
the mobilization against the deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles has
been grounded in sincere efforts on the part of core activists to develop a
German tradition of non-violence and civil disobedience.
catalogue

of

strategies

employed

by

movement

The author presents a

participants

since

the

promulgation of the 197 9 NATO Double Decision, divided into the subcategories
of

consciousness-raising or ''mobilization", activities,

".escalation", activities.

and direct

action or

The extensive but by no means comprehensive list of

possible protest actions seeks to maximize the opportunities for participation
and

to

intensify

grassroots

level.

one's
Even

personal
though

identification with
they

additional theater nuclear deployments,

bave

proved

the movement

unsuccessful

at

the

in blocking

peace protesters are judged to have

contributed significantly to the ".democratization", of postwar Geman society.

GRASSROOTS AND GE.WALTFREIE AKTIONE?i:
A S'l'UDY OF MASS MJBILlZA'.tION STRATE&IES
THE W·l!'ST GERMAN PEACE M>VnmtT

m

Joyce Marie Mushaben
University of · Missouri-St. Louis
The lawbreaker breaks the law surreptitiously and tries to avoid
Re wer obeys the laws

the penalty, not so the civil resister.
of

the State

sanctions
welfare of

but

to which he belongs, . not

out

because

to

society.

he

considers

them

of

the

be good for

the

of

fear

But there come occasions, generally rare,

when he considers certain laws to be so

unjust

as

to render

obedience to them a dishonour. Re then openly and civilly breaks
them and quietly suffers the penalty for
order

to

register

his

protest

against

their breach. And in

the action of

the

law

givers, it is open to him to withdraw his co-operation from the
State by disobeying such other laws whose breach does not involve
moral turpitude.
-

M. K. Gandhi

Non-violent Resistance (Satyagraha)

Between 1981 and

1983,

West German

political

leaders were forced

to

confront a massive wave of anti-nuclear protests, the likes of which they bad
not witnessed since the late 1960's. This recent mobilization of protest forces
directed against the deployment of additional theater nuclear weapons on German
soil finds ·its roots in a tradition of

peace activism dating back to

the

1950' s, when the catalyst to protest was the decision to pemit the reamament
of the former Reich. A number of undeniable historical parallels (Rupp 19m;
Buro 1982; Mushaben 1984) could easily lead one to assume that many of t}ie same
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activists,

the old vanguards

the late fifties,

seventies,

have reappeared on the protest

af

scene,

late sixties

and early

intent on building a uev

mwement based ou older objectives and strategies. A cloaer _aaaiuation of the
scale and

the

scope

political

enviroment

af

protest

activities

1981

since

that

have

nevertheless

charged

reveals

the German

that

recent

manifestatioua of social unrest are inspired by forces very different from the
"spectres haunting", of earlier protest eras.
Against

the backdrop of

eco110mic

chaos

and

anti-dsocratic

marking the twenties, . thirties and forties, the Federal i.epublic

sentiment
stands as

DOV

a hotbed of participation, a linchpin in the structure af Atlanti~ security
relations, as well as an anchor in the stormy seas of international political
'

ecouom.y. the dramatic changes that have been wrought in West Geman political
culture

since 194-5 are reflected in the

composition of

11

the

social

118¥

movements ... which rest cm. a complez of disparate issues, coD:f licting goals aDcl
occasionally

eiren

contradictory

political

Nuclear anziatiea and "quality of

scrategies

(Brand

198%,

1983).

life", concerns have called forth

. sensitivity with respect to mviromental issues,

a new

along with new images of

prog:eaa and rafom (lluber 198%). Poat-materialist values, e.g. the emphasis on
self-actualization and g:eater

individual

autouom.y,

have moreover

effected

sigm.f icant c:haligea iu citizm attitudes toward aonconvencional participation
and

protest

(Gaggenberger

l 980).

In

light

of

the

uperiencea aasociated vith mass mavments, however,

traumatic

historical

there are likely to be

1ll&1lY Germana who fear that such large-scale protests pose au existential threat

to the comparatively young democratic-constitutional order, or that the use of
"direct-action"1 tactics amounts to a fom af violent subversion against the
State.
This author sets out on. a dual quest, one in a theoretical direction, the
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other more empirical in its orientation. The theoretical charge of this paper
is to explore substantive connections between the emphasis on "grassroots"
democracy, on the one hand, and the preference for non-violent, direct action
tactics, on the other, . that have recently surf aced as core themes in the new
social movements. The second task will be to impose a degree of "scientific"
order

on an astounding array

of

~otest

tactics

and consciousness-raising

devices that have unfolded within the context of the "Eco-peace" movements in
the

FBG.

Tbis

prelimiDary

analysis

rests

on

six months

participant

of

observation in these movements 1mdertaken by the author from July, 1983 to
January, 1984.
The first section of the paper provides a brief overview of

the peace

movement as it has ~olved in the FBG over the last three decades, followed by
an equally telegraphic discussion of linkages between ends and means, . between
democracy,

demonstrations

and

direct

action.

The

second

part

seeks

to

distinguish betwt!en "mobilization" and "escalation" tactics, . in an attempt to
pigeon-bole a wide range of activities falling under each heading. The fiDal
portion of the paper summarizes a variety of "successes" to date, as defined by
movement activists; it further suggests the ai:eas in which much raaains to be
done, . if the peace movaaent is to prevent itself from sinking into a morass of
resentment and resignation, . now that the first Pershing II and ground-launch
cruise missiles have actually been deployed in Europe.
1.

Peace Protests

in

a Democratic State

Since 1981, the Federal Republic bas C011le to enjoy a pivotal position

aong

the

European

peace movaaents, . owing

to

its

historical

legacy,

its

geo-strategic location and also its effectiveness in mobilizing the largest
protest-coalition known to postwar Gemany. The current movement derives its
strength from a thirty-year

tradition of

peace protest

that

began with

a
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campaign against Getman reamament in the early 1950' s (Mushabeu 1985). Also
c:ontributing to its strength are the "extraparliamentary": experiences acquired
by

student activists af

through

the

the late l960's, . who continued .their "long march

institutions", during

the 1970' s.

finally,

a

proliferation of

citizen action groups (Burgeriuitiaeiyen) at the local aud regional lwels bas
led to a aev mphaais on the supposedly intimate substantive connection between
the dangers inherent. in both civilian and military ueilization of

mclear

technology (Otto 1982; Witt and Lorenz-Meyer 1983). Occupatiou experiences at
the nuclear plant sites of Wyhl and Brokdorf during the mid-seventies imparted
the valuable lessou that protest causes are better served by the mobilizatiou
of

smaller,

locally based groups than by

the traditional reliance on mass

rallies aud intellectual appeals. Camamity ties developed over the last ten
years, in fact, have enabled protest coordinators to call up more dellloustrators, .
much faster (Buchele 1982; Brand 1982, 1983). the Burgeripitiatiyen -

with a

relatively well-dweloped repertoire af protest tactics at their disposal have provided very fertile ground for the seeda of a aev anti-nuclear weapons
mov•ent (!telly and Leinen 1982).

In comparison to the peace mobilization eff or-ts af earlier decades DOtably the ''right Atomic Death", (Jppf .4a Atomtod) campaign of 1957-1959, the
11

An:ti-Emergency

Lars" (Notstandgeset;e)

and

"Eztraparliaeneary

Opposition",

protests af 1968-1969, and the ·anci-Viet l a movement during the early 1970'•
-

the latest

campaign is

characterized by significantly

less ideological

purity and strategic conaenaua. A strong religioua. c:oaponent, a specifically
ecological element and a

strong secular or •~alternative , culture" component

enjoy pre-eminent influence in what baa loosely been labeled ",t he movement,",
which has washed over the FBG in three waves. The first surge of peace protest
flowed. rather unexpectedly out of

the 19th annual

Cong%ess of

the Getman
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Evangelical Church,

which drew 150,000 participant observers to Rau.burg in

June, 1981. 'Ibis phase gave birth to a growing (if somewhat anorphous) sense of
existential

Angst

particularly

auong

youth

which

peaked

with

a

non-violent demonstration attracting over 300,000 to Bonn on October 10, 1981.
'Ibe second wave was tm.leashed by Reagan's statements in late October, 1981,
with regard to the "conceivabilitylf of a winnable, limited nuclear war. During
this phase, nuclear Angst acquired a concrete foundation as Central European
residents began to ponder the true meaning and likely personal consequences of
an atomic "flexible response.", The secular impetus provided by ecological and
pol.itical

groups

swelled

the

protest

ranks

substantially,

their

efforts

culminating in the anti-Reagan demonstrations of June 10, 1982, held in Bonn
and Berlin.

'Ibe

third stage commenced with Helmut

Kohl's

election

to

the

chancellorship on March 6, 1983, which cleared the way for the December, 1983
deployments of the first Pershing II missiles. The highpoint of this phase saying ''No": to a

specific NATO

decision -

coincided with

the

nationwide

"Action Week", of October 15-22, which rallied an estimated two to four mil lion
direct

participants.

Bundestag": during

Momentum was

two

days

sustained until

debate

of

proved

efforts

ineffective

to ":besiege the
in

blocking

the

parliament's November, . 1983 decision to proceed with deployments. Grassroots
activists · have continued their organizational efforts on both the religious
and eco-secular fronts, . their tactics and prospective recruitment bases of ten
overlapping.
With the completion of

the initial Pershing II deployments, . the peace

movement has now entered its fourth phase. For months the protesters said NEIN!
("~O !11,);

within

two

days

of

responding

DOCRI

govement managed to sound the deathknell for
"minimal consensus"

that kept

a

panoply

of

(!Ion

the groups

the

contrary 111),

the

admittedly negative
unified in the face of
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incredible odd.a.

The search for

an heir is ou,

for

a poa.i tive, mid-range

couaenaua that will enable these groups to work cohesively in reducing the
mating arsenals, . elimi.na.ting the cauaea of war and in generating alternative
defense concepts.
In sr.udying what appear to be "icycles"; of peace protest in the Federal
B.epublic,

I have deduced that political protest erincea both a substantive

dimension [i.e. focusing oU: a specific issue such aa. ".peace",I and a procedural
dimension [i.e.

involving tactics such aa decentralization.I (Muahabeu 1985).

For the most part there baa been a tendency to treat the means as analytically

distinct from the end.a,

among protesters aa well aa moug those who have

studied them. The movements of the fifties and sixties focused more ou the
substantive goals (opposing reamament), relying

011

demoustratioua, . sit-ins,

and whatever other tactics happened to be •ailable.
protesters

became

more

seleci:ive

once

they

During the seventies, .

realized.

that

SOile

means

(decentralizatiou, site occupati0l18) were more eff active than others. They also
learued that a simple transfer of the means adopted at oue site (Wyhl) could
t10t guarantee successful protest outcomes at mother (Brokdorl) -

especially

if no precautions bad been taken to school dem0l18trators iu nonviolence and

to

prepare and involve the local population (interviews with Roland Vogt, member
of

parliament, and Michael Schroeren, . press 1peaker for the Greens in Bomi, .

October 18, 1983).
The movements of
substantive

and

citizen-activists

the eighties wince a greater sensitivity to both the

procedural
and

the

climeuaioua

Bonn

government

of

protest.
have

mt

Conflicts
been

between

confined

to

a

disagreement 011er policy content (e.g., Pershing II' s versus some other type of
weapons); just as sign.if icaut is the extent to which dissenters have opposed

the decision-making process (e.g.,

refusal to peaiit a binding ref ereudum).
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Protesters

over

the

last

three

years

have

moreover

become

increasingly

conscious of the need to express their opposition through behaviors consonant
with their own substantive goals. The belief that the enda can

DO

longer be

used to justify any means bas led to a fusion of the two, a fusion manifested
in the heavy emphasis now placed on non-violent forms of direct action.
Frequent governmental and media references to the "hot autumn": of l 983 led

many

to fear

that

the upcoming peace campaign would

inevitably

violent confrontations between demonstrators and police,
destruction of

military

property

(Die Zeit

Series

result

in

as well as in the

1983).

Implicit

in this

projection are three misconceptions regarding the role of ",protest"; in postwar
democracies. The first derives £rem a tendency to equate ",protest": with mass
demonstrations; as the next section shows, denonstrations are not even the tip
of the iceberg with respect to the level and range of peace activities found in
the FBG. Secondly, there is the tendency to equate protest, denonstrations and
other forms of ";direct action", with violent action, which fails to distinguish
between

violence

as

stimulus

and

response,

between

situational contexts that precipitate the use of force.
tendency

to

perceive protest

expressed through direct

behaviors ranging from unconventional yet

the

structual

and

Finally, there is a
set

of

participation,

to

action -

legal forms of

civil disobedience, . to terrorism and sabotage (Benewick 1972) -

a

as something

inherently anti-democratic.
Focusing on the link between demonstrations and democracy,

Wolf-Dieter

Narr ( 1983 a, b, c) has argued that the more democratic a society wishes to
become,

the more radical

the freedom to demonstrate it must

grant to its

citizens. Protest and democracy are inherently linked, . not only by virtue of
the

constitutional

Grundgesetz,

Art.

guarantees
8/l GG),

but

of

free

also

speech

in v1.ew of

and

assembly

(Art.

1/ 20

the danger that political

institutions over time may align themselves with a specific set of interests.
The freedom to dem0118trate ia a fundamental right, . S•i nce it is the mean.a by
which the true agents af democratic

sover.!ignty, Dmllely the _people, find their

m.ost

provides

direct

expression.

democratic procesa- that is
protecti011 for

Protest

a

necessary

corrective

for

a

l011ger perceived to guarantee equal access and

DO

all citizen.a.

Morerer,

it is beyond the province of

state

officials to require ".that demonstrations, . open air parades and assemblies be
plamied and executed in an orderly fashion,

equipped with a leader,

in the

style af authoritative military marches": (Barr 1983a: '40). l To do so fails to
recognize

its

function

as

an

anti-authoritarian,

cliff erentialed, .

non-inatitutiooalized u:pression of the popular will (Narr 1983b).
The

second

misperception

fails

to

differentiate

between

causes

and

effects. While violence may occur in the c:oui:eu af a particular dem~11Stratiou, .
the daa0111tratious theiuelvea are being directed againac violence af a greater
order. Government predictiona of impending violence may be used to intimidate
or otherwise deter citi~ens from ezerciaing their constitutional rights af free
speech and assembly,

just aa the full-scale deploymeui: of police forces at

~

8000 at l&lkar in 1'117, an anticipated need for 15,000 police

at Wybl in 1983 -

represents a provocation and potential abuse af state power

dem0118trations

(Geulen 1983; Barr 1983a; Schroeder 1983).
The aount af "~oal diaplac:emeut"i that occurs in the wake of

a violent

c:onfrontatiou baa become a matter of particular concern to the new generation
of peace activists. In detaminin.g the responaibility for the use of violence,
authorities seem in.tent on discovering who threw the

first

stone, . as if the

individual aa.dertaking this singular action might be responsible for all of the
".trouble": (Parekh 1972). Tbia response to violence permits

DO

insight as to the

motives of the 300,000""111inus-one who have not thrown stones. There is a growing
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recognition aaong protest participants that ''violence" has occurred long be£ ore
a particular protest group meets up with police batons and teargas, . or reaches
for its own bricks (Volmerg 1983). 'the new movement E!'lince& a willingness and
determination to come to grips with the structural defects

society.

of

It

believes that the elimiuation of structural violence inherent to the global
comnnmity will be the most effective deterrent to nuclear annihilation.
further bolds that changes in the structure of
changes

in individual behavior.

'I'he

democrats who profess a belief

society are contingent upon

self-proclaimed "leftists" or

in freedom,

It

radical

equality and solidarity have a

special obligation . to distinguish themselves by denouncing violence against
persons, by eliminating hatred and images of a dehumanized enemy (Feinbilder)
from the language of political conflict (Buro 1983; Narr 1983a).
a

On

less

philosophical

practical reasons for
First,

plane,

movement

organizers have a

shifting to non-violent action

as battles over the construction of

(Startbahn West) have shown,

number

of

(gewaltfreie Aktion).

the airport runway in Frankfurt

the demonstrators'

successes

in

chasing away

police and tearing down barriers have been short-lived at best. It is 1.111likely
that those willing to engage in violent struggle will be able to match the
state's resources over time, in light of the monopoly over physical force it
enjoys in the Weberian sense. Secondly, when protesters do resort to acts of
physical

force,

the· "other

sideu manages

to

score a

double victory:

the

demonstration, like scores of rE!'lolutions that have proceeded it, will devour
its

Olfll

children by

polarizing,

alienating or

scaring off

many

potential

sympathizers, . and the protest will succumb to the logic of gleeful authorities
who view violence a self-fulfilling prophecy. A third reason is that the more
regularly

demonstrations

and

other

characterized by acts of violence,

forms

of

direct

action

come

to

be

the more likely a self-selection process
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will occur among those who participa·te.

Juat

aa those who oppose er fear

personal injury and destruction af property vill a,oid such

eDCOUlltera, . those

wbo look to violence ''for kicks" ar see violence aa an ead in itself vil.l be

drawn to participate without committing themselves to the movement'• aims. Thia
will Olll.y add credence to the state's _c!aima that the eatire

110Vement has been

ua.demiud by "communists ancl chaotica." Finally, a self-imposed. ban on the use
of physical force, is judged essential to the preservation of the identity

and

self-worth of the individual participant. the self-dynamic inherent to the uae
of

force

produces

secondary couceru,

a boc:laaerang effect;

it

reduces · the

primary goal

and negatively tr au.sf oms the participant

Hunkler 1983). .la a nle,

to

a

(lSui:o 1983a;

a/he wbo lives. by the •ord, shall perish by the

sword.
Ae protesters shift their aphasia to peaceful

they bawe bad to c:011penaate for

the lack of

form• of political acti011, .

a Geman tradition af

disobedieace md DOU-rioleace. llcce, . they draw heavily

Oil

civil

the wtitinp of

Ga.d.hi (1961), "rbor•u (1966) and Hartin Luther Ung• . Jr. bcently they have
begun to look to their owu a:perience■ with "Paragraph 11~ (the cmapaip. to
legalize abortion),

the activities of

peaceful blockade• at

Gxo ■ -engstingen

the "squatters," a• well aa
and Mutlangen aa

the first

to

the

seeps in

bllilding a natiOD&l tradition (Ebert 1982; 1981a). the fraewark far action
outliud in the aectiou below ia indicative of the sigm.fic:ant progress that
baa bea made in this direction to date.

2. 4 Peace Mqyement in seven Acts; Mobilization and Escalation
there

is

organizatioua

gceral
comprising

couenaws
the

aong

nati01111l

representatives
Coordination

of

the

Committee

30 Gumau

(wbo

met

ac

regular i.Dtenals iD Bom1. from 1981 to 1984) that the religious-eco-pacif ist
coaliti011 will continue to se-rve as a vital source af oppostion to the nuclear
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ams race being staged in Central Europe. The · 64, 000 D-Mark question is ''how? 11
There is universal agreement on the need to continue a nationwide information
cam.paign. There is major agreement on the need to begin the real political WOll'k
-

which does not neceaaarily mean bringing out the ''Green". vote, . but rather

launching assaults on ums export policies, . lobbying for additional economic
assistance to the Third World, . and compelling a reconsideration of the German
role in NATO

(Aktion Suhnezeichen l 984).

'there are growing reservations, .

however, regarding the effectiveness- of mass mobilization exercises, as well as
increasing

tensions

between

die da oben

(Bonn,

alias

the

Coordinating

Camni.ttee) and grassroots activists (die Basis).
Reservations derive from practical experiences with the mass protests of
earlier decades. Organizers have learned that after each major ",demo,": it is
too easy for too many people to have a f ev be~rs and then head for home feeling
that they have done their bit for the movement. the fact that a demonstration
of 300,000 or a human chain stretching 108 kilaaeters from Stuttgart to Neu Ulm
might have been totally ineffective in changing official policy (clearly not
i ts only aim) may escape the notice of many a self-righteous participant, ·at
least until it is time to don one's parka and half-heartedly march off to the
next demonstration.
A decentralization of
"

protest activities,

intended as an antidote to

passive111 protest of this sort, . goes band in band with the new interest in

1

civil disobedience and non-violent action. While •~civil disobedience", allows
for many different manifestations, comm.on to all acts that now fall under this
heading is the rediscovery of a sense of personal responsibility grounded in
political engagement.
from

the

the willingness to assume this responsibility springs

individual's

recognition

that

s/he

will

be

directly

(Betroff enheit) by even the most restrained of lllimited
nuclear wars.
I

affected
11
;
!
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The

peace III0'1ement

fa-ces

a

three-fold

task.:

1)

it

must

raise

couciouaueaa af , heretofore uamobilized coutituencies;

l)

it muat

the

prov-ide

mechaniaa for infonratiou gathering and social learui-ug that will enable tlleae
groups

to

become

resorting

to

se:lf'- mobiliziug;

more-

radical

or

and

3)

wen

it

must

violent:

cou.atraiu groups
strategies

from

before

all

legal-dcocratic channels have been ahauated, while at the same time gradually
1-ilding a willi~aa on the pai:t of

ever

larger IIUlllbera of

citizens to

intensify the struggle· as necessary.

In attaapting- to impose a degree of malytic:al order on the plethora of
strategies,. tactics, group ref lectiona and learning ezperiencea to which I was
exposed, . I find it uaeful to distinguish between mobilization and escalation
activities,
former

defined in greater detail below.

category, . by clefiniti011,

The tactics

fall within the realm of

contained in the
coutitutionally

sanctioue.d behaviors; alternatively, those in the latter category coutitute a
grey zone,

. 01:

molve- a couc:ioua violati011 of the lar. It is presumed that the

mmber of citizens ready to engage in acts af mobilization will far aceed
those prepared to commit themselves to escalation tactics. The- villingneea to
pursue either strategy would seem to depend

011

a maber af factors, such aa- the

personal capabilities of the woald-be participant (e.g., involving health, job,
faily

responsibilities);

couvem:i01111l

•c:hani••

ayst •ic coutrai nta

011

protest;

the failure

of

and utraparliaentary alternatives; the (perceived)

innnaneuce af the threat; and, the (perceived) consequences of DDn-reaistance.
Time and apace couatraints preclude an effort to assess the relative importance
of each af these factor•·

Similarily, I have opted for comprehensiveness in lieu of elegant prose in
presenting and claasify-ing the many activities below. Each subcategory will be
prefaced with a brief def iuitional statement, followed by a list of activities
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and concrete examples (in parentheses) where relevant.

Table l

provides an

overview of the class.if ication scheme. 2

('?able l here.)

2.1

Mobilization, Phase One: Outlining the Dangers
The activities contained in the first four subcategories correspond to the

first task of the peace movement noted above, namely, the need to raise public
consciousness

regarding

the

threat

of

mclear

war

and

its

devastating

consequences for resident·s of the Federal Republic. The idea is to trigger a
personal-emotional

response,

as

well

as

to

break a

long

standing

tabu,

proscribing public discussion of national security and defense issues in view
of postwar Gennany' s occupied status. The responsibility for organizing most of

these activities has rested at the local or regional level.
A.

Information-gathering as protest: Docume~t.i.Jlg and analyzing the
dangers of mclear war by means of teach-ins and tribunals (the
Green's Nuremburg Tribunal, February l 8-20, 1983); audio-visual
presentations, art exhibits, films (The Day After); publication
of individual pacifists' memoirs and pamphlets; information stands

in shopping districts; sponsoring public fora featuring well-known
intellectuals and political figures (Berliner Begegnung. December,
1981; Writers for Peace in Heilbronn, December, 1983).
B.

Devices aimed at changing cognitive orienations: Collecting
signatures for public advertisements in newspapers (i.e.,
".Citizens of

both Gennan States urge the Bundestag to 'Say

No', 111 General Anzeiger, November, 1983); petitions (Kref eld
Appeal); personal declarations of opposition (Gunth-e r Grass'

Table l.

Framework of Action for

Escalation Strategy

Mi>ilizatiai Strategy

I.

OUtlin.ing the Dangers

A.

I.

Infcmmtion gathering

A. Personal nonccoperation

B. Social and econanic

B. Changjng cognitive orientation

c.

II.

Legal FoJ:InS of Nonccoperation

boycotts
Changing af.fect/self-dem:lnstration

D.

·Dramatics·

E.

•soft• Protest

Outlining Alternatives

A.

Cognitive devices

B.

•0ramatic::s•

c.

•soft• devices

ll.

c.

Parliamentary and Ex~ J i aaentary Action

o.

Juridical action

Civil Disobedience,
Sensationalism

A.

III.

B. Blockades and group
disruptions
,·

Creative, Personal F.ngagenent
A.

Self-cons~ raising

B.

Political action

c.

Syni:x>lic action

III.

Sabotage, Resistance and
Force

A.

IV.

Individual acts

Developing an Infrastructure

A.

Special interest group9

B.

Net"10rlting

c.

Training and research pronction

Destruction of Property

B. Violence against people

c.
o.

Violence against self
Civil war

-14open letter to the Bundestag, .November, .1983); conducting
consultative (nonbinding) referenda; organizing and
publicizing the results of public opinion surveys (ScbwabischGmund.); promulgating resolutions by legally constituted bodies
(urging reconsideration of the NA.IO double decision, moratorium).

c.

Political self-demonstration and devices for changing system affect:
Writing detailed participant-observer reports and building files
on local peace events (Bonn 10. 10. 81; Reilbronn 1981; ';'ark-Group:
Peace, 11, SPD-Stuttgart 1983); displaying buttons, . bumperstickers, ?shirts, . scarves, . jewelry with peace motifs; arranging sports events, .
concerts; making small group pilgrimages (to Auschwitz, Dachau);

D.

Dram1tics: Staging

11

pappenings, 111 i.e.,

11

,l aat suppers 1.11 in town

squares and market places (Bonn, November 21, 1983); participating in street theater, marches, .mass denonstrations and die-ins, 11,
use of graffiti, . skywriting.
E.

11

,Softll protests: Candlelight vigils; wcmen's marches (from West
to East, Spring, 1983): torch light processions (Ranburg, Decenber·

12, 1983); conducting a weekly '?iour of silence 111 in crowded
shopping areas; "~asting for life", (limited duration).

2.2

Mobilization. Phase Two: Outlining and Generating Acceptance for

Alternatives
The

purpose

~

consciousness-raising

activities

is

not

to

terrorize

citizens into a state af inaction, but to encourage them to generate their own
security concepts in reaction to years of fruitless negotiation by ",d efense
experts", whose grab-bag of conflict resolution devices contains only military
options.

The next set. of

activities seeks to highlight the consequences of

inaction, to expose the logical fallacies of present defense doctrines and to

-15im.pa;t a sense of citizen efficacy, as well as "civil courage.•~
A.

Cognitive deices for exposing the logical incousistencies of deter-

rence doctrine: Distributing eaaays, .books,

map• of veapo1l8 situ;

convening public: debates., prof eaaional cougruaea (,W,K .!li&
Wiaaeuschaf tler fur den P'riedeu, January, .1983; Juristeu gegeu

Xriegagefahr, .March, .1982); coiiiiiW1lcatiug the fiDd.iugs af public:
hearings., .m•er• to "question periods": in parliaaent and
c:ammis■ioned

reports; using films and slide presentationa (inclu-

ding those produced br the def euM industries) to daaonatrate
poHible effec::a of disamament/ama proliferation, the ecouaaic:
baef its af industrial CODVersion and. to outline methods of

";social defense; 111 c:irmlating ''hov-t0 11, books (Reina

~

.il•

1983).
B.

Pr!'Mtic deices: Broadcasting radio plays

and. worst-case scenario•;

(lleaae 1983); staging operu aucl fiction; organising c:ommemorative
peace festivals (&mliveraary ci llirosbma/llagasaki); arraziging
major "lock againat ltoc-kets"1 cone~• (lJdo Lindenberg in !aat
Berlin, .1983; ",Say HO!~ in llaabug, .1983).

c.

Soft dayice, for promoting "civil courage111: B.eligioua services,
pariah puce weeks; prayer eel study group•.

2.3 Mobilization, Phase Three; fostering creative and Personal ':Ps,1ement
Couonant with the· second general task confronting the peace UUNaaent, the
idea i• DOC only to ezpancl. the baM af paaaive citizen support, but to turn
potatial sympathizer• into aelf-mobilizers. Personal engageaent ia the key to
a grassroots trausfcmution uot only ci the protest movaaents thaaselves, but
of the political systaa as a whole. The third class of ac::ivitiea builds on the

belief, outlined earlier, that individuals will have to change before they can
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hope to elimimte structural violence and the global-political causes of war.
A.

B.ef lection and personal behavior : Demilitarize language, use
more selective criteria for TV viewing by children; stage
public merchandise uchanges of •~ilitary toys, 1,1, also develop
children' s games that Emphasize cooperation and collective
gains; encourage personal reflection on the relation of one's
own occupation or career to the military-industrial complex;
foster a choice of peace-serving research topics among students; facilitate extensive reporting on ";positive": initiatives and outcomes by journalists; take up contacts, support
commmity involvEment with '!bi.rd World visitors and f-oreign
families living in Gemany.

B.

Fostering attentive publics and political action: Making
contributions to cover court coats for movEment activists
(case of Alexander Schubart); providing financial support
for peace organizations; involvsent in counseling work for
conscientious objectors and unemployed youth; creating jobs
for those who have chosen to leave defense-related industries;
compiling local maps on atomic/military sites and reporting
on •~aneuvers'1to the local commmity; lobbying .Yi!. A .ili
political representatives, church elders and employers
(letters, telegrams, etc.); training in non-violence workshops.

C.

Symbolic actions: Creating medals, awards, scholarships named
after pacifists for peace research (C. V. Oasietzky Medal); renaming
streets and

public libraries (Haaburg University); organizing

regional demonstrations, . ''liuman chains, 111 ''human stars,•~ alternative
I

.

I

parliaments, ":d ie-ins, 11, setting up peace camps; participating
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in workshops ou civilian/social defense and pasaive resistance;
r.eu.ouuc:-ing one's wil lingneas or right to be II def endeci"; vi th
vea't)Ons

Rnstupg Leban);

COlme

signing a llperso•l peace

treaty•~ v,ith scmeoue in an Bast European country.

2,4 Mobilization. Phase Four: Developing an Infra-structure for Peace
Initiative• aud Protests
The "grassroots"1 orientation of

reactiou.

against

the

hierarchical

the aew. social mov•ents is in part a
structure

and

''1ureaucratic

arrogauce 111

charac::eristic of the political establishment. :ror this reason activists are
reluctant to aubswae the ma.emeut under a specific roof organization -

hence, .

the lOYe/hate relationship aeeu to aiat between local initiatives and the
Coordimtin&

Committee.

"inatitutionalization111 of

Ou

the

other

band, .

certain fUDctiou

they

ia essential to

loug-tem succeas in the face af short-tam failures.
this directiou. have had either a geographical er a
A.

realize

that

the lDO'laeut' s

Initial steps taken in

occupational focua.

Peace organi;atio111 £or special-inte;:e,t group•: ror coucieutioua obj ectora and alternative-service candidates; far each
af the profeasiona (scientists, .doctors, writers, nurses,

layers, artists, trade Ulli.oniats, athletes, social scientists);
far waaea., for teachers, ._.,p eace educators, •~i media specialists
(lluu.ich, .Tubingeu); for social and nou-dencainational service
organizatiou CActi011. hconciliation); for individual religious
dencainatiou (Pax Christi; Evangeliache· Studeuten. G•eiude);
for party members (iu. the Jusos and Junge 1Jni01l); local or
regional citizen initiatives against nuclear energy and nuclear
wapons (Worpswede, .lfm 1Jllll, Braaer Friedeufor11a)

B.

Networking and system•tizing

-the

the

division of labor: sec

up

-18standing committees for the November IIPeace Weeks"; (3,000
formed in 1980) and the Easter Marches; regional coordinating
committees for the "~utumn Actions 11 of 1983 and 1984~ 1 . (Bonn, Stuttgart, .Hamburg) and for the June 17, 1984 referendum; regional level
evaluation and strategy. meetings (Klausuren, Landestreff);
partnerships, parish sponsorship of outside peace initiatives
(between East and West German Evangelicals; between the FBG . and
Poland); build affiliations with other national and international
peace organizations to promote joint sponsorship of events (END, .
ltref eld Appeal, Friends of the Earth, Atomwaf f enf reies Europa,
World COUI1cil af Churches, Waaen's International League for Peace
and Freedom, Service Civil International).

c.

Training centers and research promotion: Establish clinics
for non-violent action (Bildungs- uud Begegnungsstatte fur
Gewaltfreie Aktion e. V., Wustrov); trainer collectives;
'?'riendship Ranes•~ (Buckeburg); opening bookstores and
libraries specializing in peace literature (Saarbrucken);
supporting peace research institutes (Ressische Stif tung
in Frankfurt, Institute for Peace and Security Policy
in Raaburg, Berghof Stif tung in Berlin); setting up inf ormation services and clearing houses (Friedenszentrum . Trier;
Antikriegswerkstatt Sievershausen).

To say that this list of mobilizational de'lices and tactics is by no means
exhaustive does not m.ean, of course, that each and fNery one has been or is
currently being put to use in all of

the local commmities.

Saae of these

require m.ore financial support, or a greater degree of personal commitment than
others.

The

object

has

been to

provide as many

participatory

options

as
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possible in the hopes of integrating individuals whose personal capabilitiea,
limited

aperieuce

er

lack

af

self-confidence

involv•eut in more formalized. strud:ures.

might

Idea·lly

otherwise

preclude

speaking, . each af

these

activities might be apected to result in a social leaning experience that
I

will induce the individual to become more politically active, mm:e adamantly
opposed to further deploymeitts and, if necessary, better prepared to engage in
more radical forms of protest.
In addressing

the question of

radicalization, . one

leaves behind the

",o lwiously democratic'~ sector and. enters the grey zones of nonconventional,
atralegal pa:nicipation and eztraparliaaentary opposition. the forms of direct
action

c:onsiderad

below

are

aimed

at

more-

than

consciousness-raising, .

agenda-setting and the aobilizatiou of generalized. support. The implicit aim ia

to force a more direct

confrontad.011 between citizen.a and the &Cate.

'the

escalation of protest ia likely to occur in three more or less distinct stages.

2.

s

Escalation, Phafe Que; Legal foma of Boucoope;ation with the State and

the Military-industrial Compleg
By engaging in more radical fm:ma of protest, individuals in effect begin
to question the principle af majority rule.3 the protection of miDOrity tights
baa been written into the political codex af

aud

SpretDak

1984;

the new social movsants (Cain-a

l 9S.,) , . providing

•

at:raparliaeutary oppositiou. Individual• see thaaaelvea u
a fate more horrible than a failue to accept "le&i,timation
A.

Persoual

juatif ication

for

struggling against

hr procedure.~

uoucooperatiou: JJ.efusiug military induction completely or a

ma•• filing for conscientious objector status (before its dissolution, the Coordinatii>u Committee called. far a natiou-wide campaign);
refusing to participate in military ar nuclear-related research and
deorelopment projecta, nen in the face of possible diaiaaal ("Fot-
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tinger 18''); organizing solidarity actions for locales affected by
military maneuvers and te&ting; participating in work stoppages of
liDlited duration (",5 before 12, 111 September, 1983); critizing defense
contracts and arms exports at corporate shareholders' meetings or
plant aHem.blies; restricting agreements or terminating contracts
with the state that provide ancillary services for military
operations (e.g. , chaplains).
B.

Social and economic boycott actions against the military apparatus
and in opposition to the "militarizationll of international conf .licts: Avoidance of cultural programs with propagandistic or
nationalistic themes, especially those sponsored by the amed
forces, or by the Soviet and American Inf ormatiou Services; boycotting military parades, festivals and honorary celebrations
sponsored by the armed services (induction ceremonies); cancel-

lation of subscriptions to oewpapers and journals with
pro-ai::m.ament editorial policies; consumer boycotts of businesses
and products linked to military industries or engaged in Third
World elCploitation (manufacturers of "war
toys,•~' chemical indus,
tries); returning medals and refusing honors for past services (case
of the Frankfurter Rundschau Editor); simultaneous withdrawal by
peace support~rs of all bank deposits to inflict credit losses
("iAJc,tion Geldabheben, . December 12., 1983); resignation from political
office-; termination of party membership; calls for a general strike.
C.

Parliamentary and extraparliamentary actions against militarization:
B.ef using to approve the def euse budget; frequent use of parliamen-

tary procedure to table discussion or delay promulgation of legislation in preparation far war; making extensive use of the parliamen-
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tary "question period", to expose goverm.ent intentiona (a frequent
tactic of the "'Greena'~); ";l eaking", (uuclaasifiecl) govermaem: data
and reports regarding the deployment sites and schedules, . location
of ch•ica:l and bacteriological veapou depots; publishing the

route• to be used for military tranaports; promulgating resolutiou
_at the commuaal and municipal lerels which declare the locality a
nuclear-free or demilitarized zone (nei..n Papau, .Ia§_sel).

D. Ju.idical actions against organs of the state:

Initiate suits

agaiut discrimimtiou and violation of the 91ual protec:eiou
clauae CArt.3 GG, Art. 4 GG}

011

behaU af alteruative service

candidates now required to serve 20 months (18 months for regular
coucripts); civil suits filed in administrative courts opposing
the expropriation and uae of public land.a for military maneuvers;
suits agaiut noise pollution and failure to provide envir011aental
impact atat•ents in c:o11janctio11 with military teat_ing ancl exuciaea-;. c:outitutioml suits aeek:i.nc iu.jactiona agaiut the deployment

af af:fenaive. ••poary [Art. 'JJ,/ l GG], agaiu.at violation. af popular

sovereignty
- [Art.. 2.0/ 2
.
CArt. l

GG}, the right to lwmau dignity md peace

GG], the right to life and the free development af the per-

aoaality [Art.2 GGJ (O"fer LOO ·filed); nits againat the violation.
of im:anatioaal treaties, .nch as the Paris treaty af 1955, Art.51
of the-1Jnitecl llatiou Charter, .the 1948 Am:i-Gcocide Convention..

2.6 Escalation, Phase Tyo; Civil Disobedience and Sep.satiouali,a
Peace mcwement theorists hae attapted to outline a set of preconditioua

and behavioral guideline• for civil diaobedieuce in the contest af their third
general task -

restricting the ue af potentially alienating. illegal tactics

before c:ouventioml channels have been proved inadequate (Ebert 1983b; Buro
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1983) .

Civil disobedience is viewed as an inherently democratic method for

publicizing perceived injustices and inducing a state response to fundanental
conflicts among individuals who continue to regard themselves as full-fledged
members of a political community. An ongoing commitment to that community is

made

E!'lident by

one's willingness

to accept

the

state' s

right

to

impose

sanctions for conscious violations of the law. Civil disobedience rests on the
premise that the size of a group favoring a specific decision bears no direct
relation to its moral _E ectitude ,

especially in instances where state action

threatens to produce irrwersible consequences.
A.

Individualized acts of civil disobedience: Violations of the
ban on demonstrations within a one-mi.le zone of government
buildings (',esieg:ing the Bundestag.•~: November, 1983); wearing
masks in violation of dmonstration/assembly laws; burning draft
cards; theft or dest~uc~ion of military records; refusal on the
part of state-employed teachers to impart civil defense inf ormation in the classroalls or to participate in other forms of (para)military education; refusal to participate in career-related
emergency drills and training (medical personnel; the 1983 WClllen~s
initiative to abjure civilian service obligations imposed by Art.
12a/ 4 and Art. 12a/6 GG); illegal strikes in the defense and public
service sectors, i.e., involving transportation and hospitals; tax
wasion or channeling a percentage of one's taxes to charity ar
special funds (Friedenssteuerinitiatiyen. begun November, 1983);
refusal to pay church taxes directly to the · state; publication of
classified material; use of •~;spies for peace", to reveal special
civil defense plans for the political elites; refusal to obey military orders; trespassing for the purpose of carrying out sensation-

-23alistic acts (Blutattentat by a Green party 1118Rber againat a
Nila COIIDll&Dder, SlJDllller, 1983; the action ''auman Blood - Thia is
your business", at the IDD Ezhibition, .May, 1982); use_ af physicalfor·ce to protest visits

br

foreign dignitaries (Bush visit in

Krefeld, May, 1983; Berlin anti-ieagan riot, June, 198Z).

B.

Blockade of military sites and disruption of pi.litary activities:
Formation af "liman carpets"1 along trausport routes to prevent ums
export shii:aeuts; attempt a to disrupt military trade fairs and air

shows (&aa·stein in Auguac, 1983); blockade af ports af .entry
for 11.t\:IO equii:aeut. (Bremerhaven, .October, .1983); ";10-i:na 111 at
weapons factoriea; blockade af barrac:ka, .military command posts

(BJB.OCOM in Stuttgart, December 12, 1982), military iutalla~

tious (lleilbroD11.-Waldheide, June 1983; the- Celebrity Sit-in
at !fntlaugen, . September, 1983); peace caapa impeding military
access; peaceful inYasiou af exercise arounda (llelgolancl);
sailing into military testing waters; blockade- af the Def enae

Ministry (October, 1983.); blockade af ataaic depots

(Grossengstingen,

.Augu",

1982).

2.7 Bacalatiou, ·Phase Three: Sabotage, Resistance CWiderstand) and force
The right to resist, u
not be construed u

m

def inecl in · Article 20/ 4 GG af the Buie L• can

i.Dvitati011 to the uae Qf

individual las have been perceived u
recognizable

threat

to

the

URjuat. It is rather the existence af a

free-daocratic

condition and dictate its use,

e.g.,

force in the event that

order

aa

a whole

in the case of au att•ptd

that

shall

coup d.. etat

(Ebert 1983; Daubler 198Z). Such acts ultimately reflect a complete loaa af
faith in the self-corrective mec:hauisas af the system au.cl in the 1D0bilizati0ual
poteutial of the citizenry (Habemas 1983).
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A.

Destruction of state and public property: Acts of computer
sabotage; tearing up roads and access routes; tearing down
fences at military installations; destruction of deploymentrelated equiIJllent (e.g., the Pershing II transport put out of
commission by the ".Swords to Plowshares Four", group, .December, .

1983); cementing up storage facilities or launch equiIJllent
(Kinzig-Kreis, December, 1983).
B.

Violence against people: '?Hood actions 111 and other acts of physical
sabotage directed against officials; terrorist-type kidnappings, .

assassination attempts (none reported to date). [Note: Red Amy
Faction activities- are not considered to be directly linked with
the peace movement. ]
C.

Violence against self: Fasting to death (Jo Jordan and others
terminated their fast under pressure from movement activists in
September, 1983); self-immolation (Pastor Brusewitz in the GDB.,
August 1976: Hartmut Grtmdler in Han.burg, 1977); allowing
oneself·· to be run over by military vehicles, etc. (no · such action
reported to date).

D.

Civil War (unlikely at present)
Most of the tactics outlined in the last subcategory are likely to

appeal

to members of

isolation from one

a very small minority,

another.

acting for

Despite the rhetoric of

('~struggle'~: and •~esistance•~i) that made its way
following

the Bundestag vote of

November 22,

the most

Kampf

part

in

and Widerstand

into the press immediately

1983,

there

is

DO

concrete

evidence that those who have been most heavily involved in carrying out the
coordination tasks of the movement over the last three years are now prepared
to engage in an escalation to the third degree. A little bit of careful content
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analysis leads

ODe

to c:ouclude that the tenL ":1'esistance'~i is used broadly to

signal a detemiuation to keep the 111.09aaent alive ancl mobilized (Leinen 1983,
l 984-; Dreier l 983). the call for a comprehensive draf t-reaistance campaign and
the execution of a natiomr-ide ref erendaa

the miclear issue during the June, .

OD

1984 electioua to the European Parli•ent, sooner indicate that. the reservoir
containing legal acts of noncooperation and milder f om.s of civil disobedience
ha• not yet rm dry (Coruelsen 1984).

the 111.09seut baa yet to

C%OH

the threshold separating violent forms af

direct action from non-ri.olenc, couatitutionally feaaible f oms and democratic
politics, aa difficult as it is to drav specific theoretical lines. Hor does it
appear that the mov•ent aa a whole ¥ill be ready to take such a step iJ1 the
foreseeable future. the ratioaale for noi.d ing acts of abotage, violence and
·-·",c ivil vu 11i ruts with the broader definition af success and the •phasia
- longer-ten& . goals.

that

been· adopted

have

couf rontationa ue vised u

-- the

do

nothiq

to

promote

structura"1 (Tarro. l 982).

the

mw•eut.

Physical

tactical ~uivalea.t to a zero-sua gaae; they
,

dmocratic:

arm

by

OD

c:hangu

iu

the

";p olitical

opportmaity

when. it become• ritualistic, violent actiou is,

for the most part, devoid af political theory and, hence, eriucea nothing af
the dffelopmental character that baa become the life force of the mnr social
1110Yments.

In the judp.ent of protest coordinators, the drive for peace haa de'leloped
into

a

p,wedul,

nou-n.olea.t,

graasroota

111.09aaent:

that

baa

contributed

sigm.fi~ly to a broader underatu.ding of dmocratic proceaaes in the Federal
bpablic

(iltio11

Sulmeazeichc

1983;

Steim-eg

1982).

It

baa

fostered.

a

willingness on the part of heretofore unorganized or inactive constituencies to
take advantage af their conatitutioaal rights to aasem.ble, speak, demonstrate
and participate in defense of their own needs and interests. the peace movement

has raised the larger questions of bow to create political will and promote
political consensus in a pluralist society, in essence turning the tables on
those who

claim

that

its

character

is

inherently

assessments by movement-insiders, . the use

af

mdaaocratic.

Based on

direct action tactics

can be

iextra- 11i but not as "~nti-democratic'~i (Butterwegge ~ .!l· l 983;

11

described as

persona.l interviews with Jo Leinen, Volkmar Deile and Andreas Zumach, 1984).
The informal requirement that individuals who join in group acts of

civil

disobedience first participate in non-violence training and aligu themselves
with

an '~illff inity group•~ (Bezugsgruppe)

interest

further

'

'

in

combining

social

learuing

with

attests to the movement's
experience

in

grassroots

decision-making. Grossengstingen has become the model for would-be blockaders,
just as Wybl has served as something af a prototype for anti-nuclear energy
protests. In both cases, the perceived ",success'~ of these site occupatiollS can
not be divorced from the efforts made to establish a local base, be£ ore moving
on to

the

next

level

af

mobilization

(Stern.stein 1983).

A new

set

af

mobilizational :imperatives awaits the West Geiman peace movement, as it seeks
to consolidate its gains, _evaluate its losses and aabitiously commence with its
fourth 3.

and perhaps moat difficult -

phase.

Future Perspectives, The ":Day After"i
The government's decisou to proceed with the deployment of the Pershing II

and ground-launch cruise missiles does not

provide an adequate measure af

success or failure for the anti-nuclear movement as it has wolved since 1981.
In fact, it is not clear whether all factiollS within the movement wer really
believed they would have been able to compel the conservative leadership to
rescind Gemau approval of the NATO Double Decision of December 12, 197 9. This
does not mean, . however, that activists will sit passively m,aiting the arrival
of

subsequent weapons, as the deployments continue through 1989. The ",Autumn
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Actions '84", vere not aa eff active in drawing hundreds of thousands to protest
eo,ents, aa witnessed in October and Bovaber, 1983. Al.though the peace movaaent
did not succeed in achining it.a oatenaibl e short-tum goal of preo,enting the
deployments

altogether,

it

has bee extraordinar.i ly

effective in alerting

millions of residats to the perils posed by the 6,000-7 ,000 tactical mclear
varheada already in Germany, and the qualitatively different dangers associated

with the Pershing II technology in particular (Perdelvitz and Bremer 1981; B.abe
1983).
In the short-run, what held the kaleidoscope c£

religious,

ecological,

leftist, feminist, pacifist,
":new
wave";. and local action groups together over
.
.
the

last

three

years

were

their

feelings

being

of

directly

:imperiled

(Betroffenheit) and the (uov deceased) '~Dimal consensus", regarding a specific
set of depl~s. Bu.t thue are many other factors which, in this author's
judgment, will suatain a willingness to work collectively onrr the mm: few
years, despite the fact that the movaaent has experienced an organizational
identity

crisis

Coordinating

of

aorta

linked

(Die Zeit

Committee

to

the

February

Bovember, l 984). The first boud. rests

011

disbanding
17,

l 984;

of

the . -

officio

!'rukf11rter a.uudschau

a heightened sensitivity with respect

to the need for environmental protection, and a growing inclination to link the
hazarda

inherent

to

both

civilian

md military

technology. The second factor is the rejection af

applicatiou

af

a l011g-standiug

nuclear

tam

011

public debate af security and defense policy in the Federal B.epublic, and the
realization that protesters will be able to :impose high political coats

011

leaders who agree ta future weapons procurement prograa (e.g., the so-called
ioger'a

Plan, . possible

chemical

weapons

storage,

and

SDI

«

IIStar-Wars",

involvement). ?vo additional issues could either have a unifying effect, or an
internally divisive ou; th'!7 are the "national question", and the def initiou af
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Gemauy's future role in NATO. The final factor is not without its potentially
destabilizing aspects,

but for

seems

DOW

to

contribute

to

the movement ' s

strength, . that is, the growing willingess to experiment with and participate in
direct action politics in what was once labeled "it he subject culture"1 (Almond
and Verba 198>).
The West

Genaau

peace

movement

has

thus

far. been

able

to

reflect

cousciously ou its experiences and to prevent itself from slipping into a
pattern of ";d irectionleas activism.", It has managed to concentrate its energies
by

securing the consensus aaong critical elanents of

the protest-coalition

Ce. g. bridging the gap between commmist and religious wings) before proceeding
with specific tactics,

usually at the expense of

countless hours spent in

meetings. Its most difficult political tasks will lie, first in strengthening
its own political
lef twing

11

center 1~ l<?dged somewhere between religious, . ecological and

1

social-democratic

representation for

the

forces,

aaaller,

and

secondly,

in

providing

leas radical groups (e.g.

adequate

parish-linked or

local "ii,nitiativea~•i including f amers or older citizens> : which tend to lack a
well-developed organizational base (interview with Andreas Zumach and Vollmar
Deile of Aktion Suhnezeichen, January S, 1984).
'Ihese are only two of the many important

11

preliminary 111 tasks the movanent

1

will have to master if it is to realize its long-range goal of

creating a

nuclear-free zone in Central Europe. Looking outward, . activists will have to
continue to weave and structure a network aaong the functionally diverse and
regionally

dispersed

peace

initiatives,

and

to

provide

for

a

continuous

exchange of information aaong them. Secondly, protesters will have to provide
active support for a spirit of anti-militarism, looking for ways to reduce the
structural violence that gives rise to international confrontations. Third, . the
movement will need

to

expand its

substantive focus

by

opposing research, .
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development,

production

and

testing

relative

to

other

forms- of

vm:fare

(ch•ical, baceeriological, laser); it muat further renounce the uportation of
suc:h veapoua for uaa in the highly unsta.b le,. . underdffeloped portion• of the
worlct. rourth, in attacking the logic and consequences u10ciated vith ",balance
of tar1:or~ and deterrence doctrines, . peac:a theorists will find. it necessary to

forge a conaeusua regarding ":4lternative def eue'1 coilc:ept1. This vill require
an open and intenae debate

011

the structure af BAtO, . the Geman llole in the

Atlantic Alliance, . and the feasibility· af a bloc-f-ree European peace order.
Fifth, it should. not couclucle that it baa been driven into a def enaive- position
by

the shol:t-t8Dl failure to prwenc the cunent deployments,

Dl0'9'•eut will have

to generate

fraework

proposals for

instead, . the

reducing mating

arsenals (although it rejects the B.eagan veraiou af a ~ild-dovn.'~) in its
efforts to promote- a European mcl.ear-free z011e. Sixth., . aceivists will med to
develop

their

Olf1l

Ostpolitik

couc.ept

and

_o ff er

support

for

progreasive

movaaenta i .u the last, in recopition of the special mle to be played by both
Geman states in maintaim.ng the peace. li:aally, disillusi011ecl, disgruntled or
skeptical groups vi thin the lll09'•ent should interpret the SPD' 1 November, .1983
turubout u

proof af their

011r11

effeaivenesa, and not as a threat to their 01ru

''J;reeni issue-monopoly. It will also be necessary to seek more cooperation vith
the

,aystm partiea, ~ the trade mioua and established economic im:ereata for

11

the prcaotion· af an iDduatrial reco119ersion of the def enae sector~
legarding Mlf-walaation, . W•t Geman protesters will need to dffelop a
greatu sell&itivity to history, both with respect to the wolutiou of their

Olf1l

•ov•eat and in relation to the soc:io-hiatorical couclitious that bave fueled
the ama races of the last three decades. A.a but

\)De

component of a larger ~nev

social movaaent~ (one challenging the very premises of

advanced industrial

society in all af its ideological manifestatiou), it must recognize that it
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•

bas oot yet reached its full potential and that it stands to benefit from
active cooperation with ongoing youth movaaents, with feminist, ecologi.cal and
Third World groups.

Coordimtors can be expect.ed to take advantage of

the

extra-parliamentary mechanisms and strategies they have helped to develop in
recent years, . but they will need to monitor them.selves closely to ensure that
they adopt only such means as can be reconciled with . the substantive aims of
the movement, i.e., oon-violent forms of civil disobedience.
As this paper demonstrates, . the West German peace movement bas consciously

sought

to

establish

and

to

reiDf orce

a

crucial,

&ylllbiotic

link

between

non-violent and grassroots forms of protest and participation. The extent to
which the last four years of protest have con~tituted a miquely democratic
experience for the Federal Republic is best summarized by one of the movement's
own

civil

disobedience

practitioners, . f.ollowing

the

1982

blockade

at

Grossengstingen [my translation]:
The decisive question is therefore: Bas this new. organizatioml model
mleashed

new

learning

democracy?

in

the

direction

of

greater

We have learned in these group sessions to listen

more attentively
representative

processes

to others, . to be more

C011lpromises, . to

allow

tolerant, . to

our

questioned and to test them self-critically,

own

search for

opinions

to

be

[to learn] as group

spokespersons to differentiate between our own opinions and those af
the

group

itself,

to

distinguish

between

essentials

and

non-essentials and to have regard for the discussion as it develops,
for the mood and the feelings of the participants. We- have come to
recognize a little more clearly our strengths and our weaknesses
mirrored in the positions of others (Sternstein 1983, pp. 80-81).
These learning experiences provide the best eo.ridence available to date that

-31Gecaan peace activists will not allow thauelvea to sink into the morua of
ruig:aation thac baa aften characeeri:ed earlier

proteat

caapaipa in the

lederal iepublic. The final tut aa to the daocratic natu.%e of these protests
v-ill rest with the participants' ability to recognize that ebb• and flow•• are
natural rhythms, . that the need to forge a nev conNnaua at critical junctures
is

inherent

to

the

dynaaic

of

mo.•enc•

committed

to

a

f mdamental

transformation of political institutioua and the promotion of social change.
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Notes
1.

Efforts by the cm-government to impose a strict.er Demonstration Law were
recently orerturned in a judgment handed down by the ,ed~ral Constitutional
Court in July, 1985, which held that peace£ ul protest era cannot be
subjected to arrest for failure to obey police orders to leave a
demonstration where a minority may have engaged in acts of force, e.g. rock.
throwing.

2.

I note with gratitude that the work of Theodore Ebert bas provided an
important catalyst for this mobilization/escalation framework.
I have
nonetheleH subjected his .Aktionska.t alog to a number of additious and
reclassifications (see Ebert 1984).
I aa . also aware that some of · the
activities and categories are actually multifunctional, and that the reader
may wish to take issue with specific designations and labels.
Critical
suggestions for improving this classificatory scheme are most welcome.

3.

The March 6, 1983 election results confiming Helmut Kohl as Chancellor
have been falsely interpreted, . by the American media in particular, . as a
",p ublic mandate" in favor of the November, 1983 decision to procede with
deployments. The election campaign focused primarily on economic issues.
Polls taken two to four months prior to the Bundestag vote shoved that
public opposition to the deployments ran from 60 to 75 percent (depending
on the specific poll).
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